淺談台美關係史－Thomas66's Blog

An Overview of U.S.-Taiwan Relations

Abstract
For decades in the context of the Cold War, the U.S. government had worked to make Taiwan a bastion of the "free world," although the world acquiesced and consented to the KMT regime's takeover of Taiwan. Early in 1854, Commodore Matthew C. Perry viewed Taiwan as suitable for developing an American base of operations for the Asia-Pacific region, and proposed the United States to annex Formosa. During World War II, Taiwan caught U.S. Army and Navy's attention as an important strategic point in the region. The Navy argued that Taiwan's rich human and natural resources had a lot to bear in the postwar reconstruction of Asia. When the KMT retreated to Taiwan after the war, the U.S. reopened a consulate in Taipei and continued to support the KMT regime, despite the corruption of the regime and the “228 Massacre.”

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Truman dispatched the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to "neutralize" the Strait, although Secretary Acheson had once placed Taiwan beyond U.S. Pacific "defensive perimeter." He declared that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.” From 1950 to 1965, the U.S. poured into Taiwan more than US$3 billion in military aid, while over US$1.7 billion in the economic. In 1954, the U.S. signed a mutual defense treaty with the “ROC.” On October 25, 1971, the UN Assembly passed Resolution 2758 to expel Chiang Kai-shek's representative in the UN and allow the seat of the Republic of China being represented by the People’s Republic of China (no relation to Taiwan), challenging the legitimacy of the KMT authority in Taiwan. In February 1972, the Nixon administration and the PRC government issued the “Shanghai Communique," the first of the often cited "Three Communiques." It states: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”

For the CCP and KMT, the so-called “all Chinese” may be true, but definitely not for the people of Taiwan. Actually, the Communique contradicted the long-standing U.S. policy. On April 28, 1971, the State Department had just reiterated the U.S. position on Taiwan: "In our view, sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution." The Carter administration established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979. In the joint communique, Carter reiterated that the Government of the United States of America “acknowledges” the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Congress was sympathetic with Taiwan and passed the “Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA) with an overwhelming, bipartisan support on April 10, 1979, authorizing quasi-diplomatic relations by establishing the “American Institute in Taiwan” (AIT). The TRA aims to govern future unofficial relations with Taiwan in the absence of formal ties. It declared it the policy of the United States “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and so on.

Under the Reagan administration, Taiwan policy became increasingly deferential toward China. Reagan's policy was seriously incoherent and even contradictory. On July 14, 1982, the U.S. intermediaries in Taiwan gave the government there a list of so-called “Six Assurances.” The list includes that the U.S. would not mediate between Taiwan and Beijing; the U.S. would not pressure Taiwan into negotiating with Beijing; and the U.S. would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. On August 17, 1982, the Reagan administration signed a joint communique with China in Shanghai (known as the third of the “Three Communiques"), in which the administration agreed that “it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over time to a final resolution.” These "Three Communiques," along with the Taiwan Relations Act, have formed the basis of U.S. policy toward Taiwan ever since. On February 28, 1983, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution on Taiwan that declared: “The future of Taiwan should be resolved peacefully, in a form acceptable to the people of Taiwan that is free from coercive means and consistent with the spirit of the bill passed by Congress and the U.S.-PRC Communique.”

In late1995, and again in early 1996 when Taiwan was holding the first direct presidential election, China conducted provocative missile tests near Taiwan's shores. In reacting to the 1996 crisis, President Clinton dispatched two aircraft battle groups from the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, constituting the largest military deployment in Asia since the Vietnam War. Clinton really did a brave and noble thing. And Lee Teng-hui was elected on March 23. But in June 1998 while visiting China, President Clinton informally announced the so-called "Three No’s" policy -- do not support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan"; do not support Taiwan independence; and do not support Taiwan to join in international organizations as a sovereign state. It constituted an unwise and dangerous tilt toward China at the expense of Taiwan's political and security interests. This announcement and the proposal of an "interim agreement" between China and Taiwan began to weaken Taiwan's trust and faith in the U.S. In 1999, President Lee openly defined Taiwan-China relations as a “Special State-to-State Relationship” (also called the “Two States” theory).

Since the Truman Statement of June 27, 1950, the basic U.S. position is that the status of Taiwan is undetermined and it was reaffirmed by the SFPT ratification in 1952 with the U.S. as the principal occupying power. This is the origin of the "Taiwan question." But the U.S. policy has consistently ignored the will of the Taiwanese people. The so-called "One China" framework leaves Taiwan isolated and friendless, barred from the United Nations and most other international organizations. It has given China a veto over any Taiwanese change: their name, their constitution, even their flag! And China has never accepted the U.S. restriction against its use of violence to take over Taiwan, including the ongoing missile deployment strategy, the so-called “Anti-cession Law,” etc.

If Taiwan is eventually annexed by China with U.S. acquiescence, Taiwanese will fall back to the hereditary tragedy of being ruled by outsiders and the hard-earned fruits of the past century will be vanished overnight. The credibility of the U.S.-Japan security alliance will be destroyed. And China will be capable of extending its military power through the first Pacific island chain, which runs from Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Therefore, the U.S. must make it unequivocally clear that self-determination of the people on Taiwan must be respected and any dispute between Taiwan and China must be settled peacefully. Then if there is any chance for an ever-lasting settlement over the "Taiwan question," it may rest on dialogues between China and Taiwan conducted on equal status and in equal terms, although there is no reason to believe that China will honor any agreement and Taiwan won’t under any circumstances give up its sovereignty.

冷戰之際，美國力圖台灣成為「自由世界」堡壘，因而默許國民黨政權佔有台灣。早在1854年，逼使日本幕府開放門戶的美國東印度艦隊培理 (Matthew C. Perry) 艦長即已提出「培理報告」，建議美國政府攻佔台灣，作為美國亞太貿易基地。二次大戰期間，美國陸海軍皆已關注台灣在亞太區的重要戰略位置；海軍並勸說，台灣的豐富人文及自然資源，足可擔當戰後亞洲的重建任務。二戰之後國民黨敗退台灣，美國在台北重開領事館，並支持國民黨政權，而未計及其政權腐敗無能和發生「二二八大屠殺」。1950年韓戰爆發後，美國政府恢復對國民黨政權的軍事援助 (雖曾一度擬棄置不顧)，並於1954年十二月締結「美華共同防衛條約」。自1950年至1965年為止，美國提供台灣30億美元以上的軍事援助，以及超過17億美元的經濟援助。除美國軍事顧問團之外，以原日本軍的富田直亮 (白鴻亮) 為團長的「白團」也秘密加入軍事顧問團，共同支援國民黨軍的裝備與訓練。

1972年二月，尼克森政府與中國政府發佈「上海公報」(此為「三公報」之首一公報)，其中述及「美國認知，台海兩邊所有中國人皆主張只有一個中國，而台灣是中國的一部份。美國政府並不挑戰該一立場。」實則，所謂「所有中國人」云云，就中國共產黨及中國國民黨而言或許為真，對台灣人而言則絕對不是。而公報內容，亦已違反美國的長期政策。前此不及一年，國務院方重申美國對台立場：「台澎主權係一未決問題，有待未來國際解決。」1979年一月1日，卡特政府與中國建立外交關係，並斷絕對國民黨政權的承認。在聯合公報中，卡特重申美國政府「認知」中國立場：只有一個中國，而台灣是中國的一部份。美中關係正常化以後，對一向自稱代表全中國的國民黨政權來說，不啻一記重擊；而國民黨在台灣長期壟斷所有政治權力，台灣人民亦日漸質疑並挑戰其統治的合法性與正當性 (國民黨則加緊鎮壓而爆發「美麗島事件」)。

美中建交後，美國國會同情台灣處境，乃以獲得兩黨壓倒性支持的優勢，於該年四月通過「台灣關係法」(TRA)，並授權成立「美國在台協會」(AIT)。此一創先例的美國國內法，著眼於美國與「台灣住民」之間的關係；在於維持其與台灣「政治實體」之實質關係，強調對以任何非和平方式威脅台灣的嚴重關切，並將繼續對台灣提供必要的防衛武器 (其適用範圍僅限於台灣及澎湖列島)。「台灣關係法」及對中「三公報」，此後成為美國對台政策的基礎。1982年，雷根政府更對台灣提出「六項保證」，包括不在台灣與北京間居中調解、不施壓台灣與北京談判，以及不正式承認中國對台灣的主權。1983年，美國參議院通過一份台灣決議文，宣稱台灣前途應該和平解決，其方式可為台灣人民所接受，不受脅迫，且符合國會所通過法案及美中公報之精神。

1995年六月，在中國強大壓力下，李登輝總統順利完成美國康乃爾之行；七月起，中國在台灣外海持續展開一系列軍事演習，並在東海發射飛彈。迄1996年三月，中國總計舉行七波軍演，其東風導彈亦曾射至高雄、基隆外海，試圖影響台灣在三月23日舉行的首次總統直選。面對此一台海危機的考驗，美國柯林頓總統乃毅然派遣第七艦隊兩支航空母艦戰鬥群 (獨立號及尼米茲號) 前往台灣海峽；中國顯然失算，演習遂於25日悄悄收場。三月23日，李登輝當選全民總統，象徵台灣人主權的行使。1998年六月，柯林頓總統於訪問中國時發表所謂的「三不」政策：不支持「兩個中國」或「一中一台」；不支持台灣獨立；以及不支持台灣以主權國家加入國際組織。雖則「不支持」自有別於「反對」，唯柯林頓此一不智之舉已使美國向中國傾斜，而以台灣政治與安全利益為代價。終亦促使李登輝總統於1999年七月，公開提出台灣與中國的「特殊國與國關係」(或謂之「兩國論」)。

杜魯門總統於1950年六月宣佈「台灣海峽中立化」，同時宣稱「台灣未來地位的決定，必須等待太平洋地區安全之恢復，對日和平條約之簽訂，或者由聯合國予以考慮。」自此，美國的基本立場，即是「台灣地位未定論」。此一立場，復於1952年《舊金山和約》中獲得確認，而美國乃作為主要佔領當局。此即「台灣問題」之由來。唯長年以來，美國政策始終忽視台灣人民意願。所謂「一中」架構，讓台灣成為國際孤兒，受阻於加入聯合國及其他大多數國際組織；台灣若作任何改變 (如正名、制憲、旗號等)，中國儼然有其否決權。反之，中國叫囂欲對台灣武力侵犯 (如飛彈佈署、「反分裂法」等)，美國卻無能制止。台灣一旦在美國默許下遭受中國併吞，台灣人將又落入任由外人宰制的宿命悲劇；而百年來台灣先人的辛勞奮鬥成果，也將一夕之間化為烏有。美國與日本的安保結盟隨之蕩然無存，中國勢力則將穿越太平洋第一島鏈 (連結日本、南韓、沖繩、台灣、菲律賓及印尼)。故此，美國必須毫不含糊表明，台灣人民的獨立自主意願必須獲得尊重，且台灣與中國之間任何爭論的解決皆不得訴諸非和平方式。而「台灣問題」果將獲得長遠解決，或有賴於中國與台灣間以同等地位所進行的對話 ─ 雖則一般並不相信中國會信守承諾，且台灣亦不致放棄其主權堅持。

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